Not All Crises Are Created Equal: US Humanitarian Intervention in the 1990s by McGrath, Rachel
 NOT ALL CRISES ARE CREATED 
EQUAL 
US Humanitarian Intervention in the 1990s 
By: Rachel McGrath 
 
 
Senior Honors Thesis 
Department of Political Science 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 
 
 
2 April 2018 
    
Approved: 
_________________________ 
Dr. Robert Jenkins (Thesis Advisor) 
Dr. Patricia Sullivan (Reader) 
Dr. Navin Bapat (Reader) 
  
McGrath 1 
 
List of Tables and Charts: 
UN Peace Operations Selection Chart……………………………………….19 
Brune-Joffe Criteria Chart……………………………………………………53 
UN Peace Operations Selection Chart—Cases Eliminated………………….66 
Integrated Timeline…………………………………………………………..67 
Table of Contents: 
Introduction…………………………………………………………………....2 
Problem Posed…………………………………………………………………3 
Background……………………………………………………………………6 
 The United Nations and Humanitarian Intervention…........................6 
 Why States Intervene…………………………………………………10 
 Humanitarian Intervention and United States Foreign Policy...…….14 
Methods and Data Collection………………………………………………..18 
Hypothesis……………………………………………………………………25 
Results……………………………………………………………………….25 
 Somalia………………………………………………………………26 
 The Former Yugoslavia background………………………………...33 
 Croatia………………………………………………………………35 
 Bosnia……………………………………………………………….38 
 Rwanda………………………………………………………………45 
 Brune-Joffe Criteria…………………………………………………52 
 PDD-25 and United States Foreign Policy……….…………………53 
Thoughts and Conclusion……………………………………………………57 
Bibliography…………………………………………………………………61 
Appendix…………………………………………………………………….66  
McGrath 2 
 
Introduction: 
 This thesis is about US Humanitarian Intervention in the 1990s and American policy 
creation regarding humanitarian intervention. I am specifically looking at humanitarian 
intervention undertaken by the United States through military means, specifically through UN 
peace operations.  
 While there are many types of interventions—economic, diplomatic, military (as in strict 
military invasion)—I am interested in intervention that is motivated by humanitarian goals. 
Humanitarian intervention implies that intervention is not taken for purely strategic interests, but 
is meant to benefit foreign civilians. While there can be humanitarian efforts made to alleviate 
suffering in different crises, I am specifically looking at man-made conflicts such as civil war 
and genocide, versus other types of humanitarian efforts such as natural disaster relief.  
 When we see images of homes and towns and lives torn apart by violence, we want to 
know why it is happening, and what is being done about it. Man-made conflict is not new, nor is 
going anywhere. While this thesis is focused on cases of humanitarian crises in the 1990s, there 
are humanitarian crises occurring today, including the Syrian Civil War, and the ethnic cleansing 
of the Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar.  This thesis raises questions about policy creation of 
intervention in humanitarian crises, which is still relevant in crises today. 
 While there is the concern that intervention could exacerbate violence through moral 
hazard, one might wonder, as I have, why the UN or the US decide to intervene in some crises 
and not others.  
 There is a difference between how we, as individuals and humanitarians, act, and how a 
state acts. By attempting to better understand states’ foreign policy creation regarding 
humanitarian intervention, perhaps we can better understand how to relieve suffering in the 
world.  
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Posing the Problem: 
 In the 1990s, the US and the international community through UN Security Council, had 
the opportunity to engage in Humanitarian Intervention (HI) outside of Cold War constraints. HI 
provides an inherent paradox within the international community. On the one hand, the norms of 
Westphalian sovereignty dictate that states should stay out of the internal affairs of another 
country. While on the other hand, HI is driven by the idea that there is a responsibility of security 
to civilians.1 Both the norm of non-intervention and humanitarian intervention function within 
the international community simultaneously, as one norm has not overtaken the other. The 
question then becomes, what is the responsibility (both in theory and in expectation) of third 
parties in the security of civilians in the world.2 While intervention is not a new phenomenon in 
international relations, the ‘humanitarian’ caveat adds an extra layer to intervention.3  
Rothschild outlines how at the end of the Cold War there was a transition in the idea of 
security from the security of nations to human security—in which every individual is entitled to 
security by virtue of being a human being.4 HI rests its legitimacy upon human security; HI is 
acceptable and even desirable because the international community is providing the service of 
security to those whose own government is unwilling or unable to do so.  Are states really 
willing to expend their resources for the security of foreign civilians? And if the answer is yes, 
which it must be since HI has been conducted, the next question must be: how does a state 
decide that it should participate in Humanitarian Intervention? I am interested in what factors 
influence the United States to engage in Humanitarian Intervention through military means.  
                                                          
1 Rothschild, Emma. "What Is Security?" Daedalus 124, no. 3 (1995): 53-98. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Finnemore, Martha. “Changing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention,” in Essential Readings in World Politics 5th 
Edition, edited by Karen A Mingst and Jack L Snyder New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2014.  
4 Rothschild, Emma. "What Is Security?" Daedalus 124, no. 3 (1995): 53-98. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20027310.  
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From the end of the Cold War up until the 9-11 terrorist attack in New York, the 
international climate on humanitarian intervention was much more open and positive. The open 
atmosphere for participation in HI is illustrated by the UN’s expansion into peace missions that 
went beyond traditional peacekeeping.5 Likewise, the UN noted that there was a change in how 
peacekeeping operations were done in this era.  
The UN shifted and expanded its field operations from “traditional” missions involving 
generally observational tasks performed by military personnel to complex 
“multidimensional” enterprises. These multidimensional missions were designed to 
ensure the implementation of comprehensive peace agreements and assist in laying the 
foundations for sustainable peace.6 
The shift that occurred in the post-Cold War era of peacekeeping from a more conservative 
approach to a more active approach, with more ambitious ‘mandates’ illustrated that there was an 
increased feeling during this time that humanitarian interventions were both good and fruitful.7 
The UN missions of UNPROFOR in Yugoslavia, UNAMIR in Rwanda, and UNOSOM II in 
Somalia were all peacekeeping missions that were implemented by the UN that followed a more 
extended definition of peacekeeping.8 Unlike traditional peacekeeping in which peacekeeping 
forces only monitored the implementation of a ceasefire, these UN missions were involved when 
there was not a peace agreement (UNPROFOR) or the area devolved into violence (UNAMIR 
and UN missions in Somalia). The more open atmosphere for peacekeeping at the end of the 
Cold War is important as it marked the UN’s newfound ability to fully utilize and implement the 
                                                          
5 “Our History.” (History of Peacekeeping; published by United Nations Peacekeeping, United Nations).  
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid.  
8 Ibid.  
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tools endowed to it to solve international security dilemmas—as humanitarian intervention could 
be pursued outside of realpolitik.9  
 In this thesis, I will examine the United States’ policy creation for participating in 
humanitarian intervention in the initial period after the Cold War. As the US is one of the major 
international players and has a large military presence globally, it is important to understand US 
decision making processes. Likewise, the US provides most of the military support in the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and therefore, US decision-making can have an effect on 
other international actors. By studying foreign policy creation by the United States regarding 
Humanitarian Intervention in the early 1990s, one can understand challenges to intervention that 
international actors face when presented with humanitarian crises.  
In order to understand the mechanisms behind US intervention, I am pursuing my 
research through case studies, as this will allow me greater insights to the US HI policy 
determinants. The following research mission helped guide this thesis: 
What factors influenced the US’s participation, or non-participation in humanitarian 
intervention in Somalia, Bosnia-Herzegovina*, Croatia, and Rwanda in the 1990s?  
*Note: Bosnia-Herzegovina will be referred to as Bosnia throughout the remainder of this paper.  
Finnemore defines HI as “deploying military force across borders for the purpose of 
protecting foreign nationals from man-made violence.”10 While I acknowledge that aid in other 
capacities such as natural disaster relief and food aid may also constitute humanitarian 
intervention, like Finnemore, I am more interested in the military aspect of intervention, as well 
as man-made violence, which is present in all of my chosen cases. In the chapter, “Keeping the 
Peace: Politics and Lessons of the 1990s,” Durch clarifies definitional difference between 
                                                          
9 Durch. “Keeping the Peace: Politics and Lessons of the 1990s.” p 1-2 
10 Ibid. p. 497 
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different types of peace operations and defines humanitarian intervention as “a temporary 
measure to help non-combatants survive the stresses of war and to relieve acute suffering” that 
may be undertaken during “an ongoing conflict or situation of anarchy.”11 Taking Finnemore’s 
and Durch’s definitions together, humanitarian intervention will be defined as the use of military 
force across borders by third party actors in a situation of ongoing conflict for the protection and 
alleviation of suffering of civilians.  
 
Background: 
The United Nations and Humanitarian Intervention:   
As humanitarian intervention is tangential to the issue of state sovereignty and the notion 
of non-intervention, it is important to note how non-intervention is discussed in the UN Charter. 
The seventh point of Chapter 1 Article 2 of the UN Charter speaks to the norm of non-
intervention and codifies the norm:  
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene 
in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall 
require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but 
this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter 
VII.12  
Durch explains that humanitarian intervention, while at first glance may seem to violate local 
sovereignty, is allowed when the UNSC rules that the conflict threatens “international peace and 
                                                          
11 Durch. UN Peacekeeping, American Politics, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s p 4 
12 “The Charter of the United Nations” Chapter 1, Article 2 
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security.”13 In Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the UNSC is given the right to use force against 
breaches of peace.14 
In the book, UN Peacekeeping, American Policy and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s, 
Durch discusses the definitional differences between traditional peacekeeping, multidimensional 
peace operations, humanitarian intervention, and peace enforcement operations.15 Traditional 
peacekeeping is the monitoring of a ceasefire between belligerents as a confidence building 
mechanism to create an environment conducive to negotiations.16 Each subsequent intervention 
builds on this notion of traditional peacekeeping with increasing layers of involvement by 
international actors. Multidimensional peace operations were more ambitious missions 
undertaken by the UN Security Council near the end of the Cold War in which the operation 
worked to “help implement a peace accord that addresses the causes of the underlying 
conflict.”17 These operations were more invasive as the assistance provided for implementing a 
peace accord takes a more active role in ending the conflict versus a passive traditional 
peacekeeping operation. Unlike at traditional peacekeeping operation in which the peacekeepers 
provide “political space for negotiation” through monitoring, multidimensional operations help 
implement peace accords, as well as provide election monitoring, independent news, and power 
sharing agreements to help provide lasting peace.18 Humanitarian intervention, takes action “to 
relieve suffering in the midst of an ongoing conflict or situation of anarchy” which is described 
by Durch as operationally difficult due to involvement during the conflict which can make the 
                                                          
13 Durch. “Keeping the Peace.” P 5 
14 “The Charter of the United Nations” Chapter VII Articles 39, 42 
15 Durch. “Keeping the Peace: Politics and Lessons of the 1990s” UN Peacekeeping, American Politics, and the 
Uncivil Wars of the 1990s p. 3-10 
16 Ibid. p. 3 
17 Ibid. p. 4 
18 Ibid. p 3-4, 23-25 
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mission vulnerable to violence by the belligerents.19 Durch describes interventions in 
Yugoslavia/Bosnia and Somalia as cases of humanitarian intervention.20 Peace enforcement 
differs from humanitarian intervention, as the intervener uses “coercive means to suppress 
conflict and create a de facto cease-fire and facilitate negotiations between belligerents, or to 
protect non-combatant populations facing a general collapse of governance.”21 Durch points to 
the NATO IFOR (Implementation Force) in Bosnia, and the US led UNITAF intervention in 
Somalia as examples of peace enforcement.22 The classifications of missions between these four 
categories can be rather fluid. Durch graphically represents the movement of peace operations in 
Somalia and Bosnia between classifications to emphasize the fluidity individual UN missions 
can experience during intervention.23  
The literature on Humanitarian Intervention is unclear about the definitional differences 
between humanitarian intervention and other kinds of peace operations, such as 
multidimensional operations and peace enforcement. However, there does seem to be a clear 
break between UN traditional peacekeeping and UN peace operations that go beyond the 
traditional sense. While it is important to note definitional differences between types of 
intervention, these definitional differences are less of my focus. Similarly, as Durch illustrates 
through his graphs, there is movement within one intervention between classifications of 
intervention. This movement within cases further complicates how intervention cases are 
discussed. 
                                                          
19 Durch. p. 4-5 
20 Ibid. p. 4-5 
21 Ibid. p 6 
22 Ibid. p 27 
23 Ibid. Figure 1.1 p. 8 (Figure 1.2 p 9 shows more theory based graphical representation). 
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As noted in the UN Peacekeeping publication “Our History,” peacekeeping was 
expanded out from its earlier conception as traditional peacekeeping to multidimensional peace 
operations.24 The successes of earlier peacekeeping missions in the late 1980s and early 1990s 
led the UN to pursue more ambitious missions in which conflict was still occurring, such as 
conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Rwanda.25 There was an increase in the number 
of peace missions undertaken by the UN at the end of the Cold War.26 As Wolfrum illustrates in 
his chapter “The UN Experience in Modern Intervention,” the UN upholds international norms, 
while the UNSC is the body that has the executive privilege of exercising UN power through 
peace missions.27 As a tool of HI, the increase in UN Peacekeeping missions paralleled the “new 
consensus” within the UNSC.28 
Adelman described the shift that took place within the UN under the leadership of Javier 
Perez de Cuellar and Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in which UN leaders hoped that morality could 
extend past legal documents.29 Adelman writes, “the UN was not simply hoping to be a grotian 
legal system but claiming to be a moral teacher. International law merely reflected that 
morality.”30 The moral leadership that the UN provides showed itself early on within the UN in 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as the UDHR was published in 1948, three years 
after the UN Charter was signed. The UDHR was aimed at providing a moral guideline to the 
UN regarding Human Rights and the dignity to which all human beings were entitled.31 The last 
                                                          
24 “Our History.”  
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Wolfrum “The UN Experience in Modern Intervention” in International Intervention: Sovereignty versus 
Responsibility p. 95-97 
28 “Our History.” 
29 Adelman, Howard. “Theory and Humanitarian Intervention” in International Intervention: Sovereignty versus 
Responsibility, edited by Michael Keren and Donald A Syland,  P. 10 
30 Ibid. P. 10 
31 “The Universal Declaration of Human Rights” Preamble 
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article of the declaration states “Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for 
any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the 
destruction of any of the rights and freedoms forth herein.”32 While the UDHR does not 
specifically speak to the role of the international community during these crises, it does start to 
outline the aspect of moral leadership involved in the UN. The UN writes that Human Rights 
Law has its basis from the UDHR. In describing how this type of law is enforced, the article 
describes how signatory states sign on to the agreement and put in place domestic measures as a 
way to make sure that human rights are being respected. While the UN states that there are 
regional and international forums for complaints, one could see how this structure would allow 
human rights violations to occur, especially during a time in which states do not want to confront 
each other about these violations—such as during the Cold War.33 
 
Why States Intervene: 
Humanitarian Intervention is complex as it involves at least two major considerations: 
first, the crisis and the moral imperative to help the victims, and second, the intervener, and their 
capabilities, motivations, and interests in intervention. The internal tension in Humanitarian 
Intervention lies between respecting the sovereignty of another state and taking on the moral 
responsibility to help civilians caught in domestic conflicts, such as civil wars or violence 
perpetrated by one group onto another. Adelman states, “In a global nation-state system, there is 
a compact among states that each has exclusive jurisdiction over the land and peoples within 
                                                          
32 “The Universal Declaration of Human Rights” Article 30 
33 “The Foundation for International Human Rights Law.” Published by the United Nations. Accessed 24 March 
2018 
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their respective territories.”34  This compact that Adelman describes is the compact in which 
nations will respect the sovereignty of one another.  
In the chapter “When is Intervention Likely?” Arie Nadler took a social psychology 
perspective when looking at the decision making process for intervention, and then tried to 
extrapolate his findings to the international system. He concluded that intervention was more 
likely when the costs of non-intervention were higher than the costs of intervention, when the 
actor is motivated by empathy towards the victim, and when the actor feels a sense of similarity 
to the victim.35 The explanations of HI by Sylvan and Pevehouse, Rost and Greig, and Nadler 
point to various ways in which Humanitarian Intervention can be approached. While Sylvan and 
Pevehouse take a state-centric approach, Nadler looks at the role of the victim and his or her 
emotional proximity to the intervener to prompt intervention.  
The stress between the international norm of non-intervention and the moral imperative 
of intervention can be seen, not only on the aggregate level of the international community, but 
also in specific cases. Adelman, Nadler, and Sylvan and Pevehouse, all address the stress put on 
the international system to simultaneously preserve the traditional sense of Westphalian 
sovereignty and promote the wellbeing of all humans (through intervention when necessary).36 
Sylvan and Pevehouse articulate the internal tension in HI in their chapter, “Deciding whether to 
Intervene,” when they state that there is an abundance of literature by philosophers and political 
scientists “in addressing the issue of whether and under what circumstances intervention is the 
                                                          
34 Adelman, Howard. “Theory and Humanitarian Intervention” in International Intervention: Sovereignty versus 
Responsibility, edited by Michael Keren and Donald A Syland, 3-24. Portland: Frank Cass, 2002. Pg 3-4. 
35 Arie Nadler. “When is Intervention Likely?” in International Intervention: Sovereignty versus Responsibility, 
edited by Michael Keren and Donald A Syland, 40-55. Portland: Frank Cass, 2002. Pg 52.  
36 Keren, Michael, and Donald A Sylvan, ed. International Intervention: Sovereignty versus Responsibility. Portland: 
Frank Cass, 2002.  
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appropriate solution to the dilemma posed by a collision between the values of local sovereignty 
and international responsibility.”37  
In the article, “Taking matters into their own hands: An analysis of the determinants of 
state-conducted peacekeeping in civil wars,” Rost and Greig conducted quantitative research on 
data of peacekeeping in civil wars. Rost and Greig’s research was from an international 
perspective and focused much of the analysis on the decision making process of smaller nations 
to intervene in civil wars; however, they collected data regarding larger nations as well.38 
Although the research conducted by Rost and Greig is focused on many state actors, and only 
discusses peacekeeping in civil wars, the authors discuss factors that affect intervention by major 
powers, non-major powers, and factors that affect both types of intervening states. Rost and 
Greig find that “major power peacekeeping is strongly driven by conflicts that show the greatest 
capacity to spread, those producing the greatest number of battle-deaths and involving a large 
number of warring parties.”39 However, the authors also note that the number of refugees does 
not have a significant effect on major powers, and that civil wars that have genocide occurring 
during the conflict are not any more likely than other conflicts to receive intervention.40 Rost and 
Greig also argue that state led intervention does not shy away from the tough cases, but rather 
that states get involved in the most difficult conflicts.41 This is an important consideration when 
approaching humanitarian intervention, as intervention by states is not undertaken as a way to 
easily demonstrate military might, but rather, states are involving themselves in difficult 
                                                          
37 Sylvan, Donald A, and Jon C Pevehouse. “Deciding whether to Intervene.” in International Intervention: 
Sovereignty versus Responsibility, edited by Michael Keren and Donald A Syland, 56-74. Portland: Frank Cass, 2002. 
Pg 57.  
38 Rost and Greig, (2011) “Taking Matters into Their Own Hands: An Analysis of the Determinants of State-
Conducted Peacekeeping in Civil Wars.” Journal of Peace Research 48(2): 171-184. 
39 Rost and Greig. “Taking Matters into Their Own Hands.” p 182 
40 Ibid p 181-182 
41 Ibid 182 
McGrath 13 
 
conflicts. This aspect of intervention is important when discussing a state’s calculation of a 
reasonable chance of success in humanitarian intervention.  
The question of whether humanitarian actions are ever humanitarian or rather a façade for 
self-serving interests strikes at the heart of the question of why states, and in this thesis, the US, 
would choose to participate in HI. Hans J Morgenthau wrote the article “To intervene or not to 
intervene.” Although Morgenthau does not specify types of intervention (such as humanitarian), 
he claims that intervention is an opportunistic endeavor by states to secure their interests abroad. 
Morgenthau illustrates the realist nature of intervention by citing the US and USSR’s reversal of 
which side they were supporting in the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo. However, 
Morgenthau’s article was written in 1967, during the height of the Cold War, in which capitalist 
versus communist ideology took precedence in the international arena. Intervention undertaken 
during the Cold War can be interpreted as a way to gain strategic placing in the world, versus 
choosing cases based on humanitarian need.42 Morgenthau states that the two conditions for 
intervention are national interests and ability to succeed.43 While the Cold War atmosphere 
present in Morgenthau’s argument is not present in my study, the relevant conditions he presents 
could still be considered when approaching HI in the 1990s.  
In the article, “National interest, humanitarianism or CNN: What triggers UN peace 
enforcement after the Cold War?,” Jakobsen examines reasons for initiating peace enforcement 
operations in Kuwait, Northern Iraq, Haiti, Rwanda, and Somalia. Jakobsen finds that 
“Humanitarian interventions…are driven by a combination of the CNN effect and good chances 
of success” as states aim to lower their costs of intervention.44 Jakobsen describes the CNN 
                                                          
42 Durch. “Keeping the Peace.” P 2 
43 Morgenthau, Hans J (1967) “To intervene or not to intervene.” Foreign Affairs 45(3): 425–436. 
44 Jakobsen, Peter Viggo (1996) “National interest, humanitarianism or CNN: What triggers UN peace enforcement 
after the Cold War?” Journal of Peace Research 33(2): 205–215. Pg 205 
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effect as the pressure exerted by the media, through the visual exposure of a conflict, on the 
government to “do something” in the conflict. As a result, the government intervenes.45 Jakobsen 
highlights the importance of media, successfulness and national interests for policy creation, and 
points out the main factors he identified for each case of intervention he discussed—such as 
traditional national interest (oil) in the case of intervening in Kuwait.46  
 
Humanitarian Intervention and United States Foreign Policy: 
While it is important to understand how humanitarian intervention has been integrated 
into UN peace operations, and why states intervene, it is also important to note how the United 
States, as state actor, fits into this narrative as well. The book, After the End: Making US Foreign 
Policy in the Post-Cold War World, brings perspective into the various actors involved in 
American foreign policy decisions as well as addresses the change in the international system at 
the end of the Cold War.47 The shift from a bipolar world to a world in which the US became the 
‘global hegemon’ created a vacuum in foreign policy in which it became unclear what the role of 
the US should be.48 The end of the bipolar order allowed the United States to reprioritize its 
foreign policy outside the constraints of the Cold War.49 
                                                          
45 Jakobsen “National Interest, Humanitarianism or CNN: What Triggers UN Peace Enforcement After the Cold 
War?” p 206 
46 Jakobsen. “National Interest, Humanitarianism or CNN.” p 207-208. 
47 Scott, James M, ed. 1998. After the End : Making U.S. Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War World. N.C.: Duke 
University Press.  
48 Scott, James M, and A Lane Crothers. “Out of the Cold: The Post-Cold War Context of US Foreign Policy” in After 
the End : Making U.S. Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War World, edited by James M Scott N.C.: Duke University 
Press, 1998. Pgs 1-25.   
49 Ibid. p 1-25. 
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The United States attempted to bring together its interests in UN peacekeeping missions 
with American national interests. In President Clinton’s address to the UN in September 1993, he 
stated,  
UN peacekeeping holds the promise to resolve many of this era’s conflicts. The reason 
we have supported such missions is not, as some critics in the United States have 
charged, to subcontract American foreign policy, but to strengthen our security, protect 
our interests, and to share among nations the costs and effort of pursuing peace.50  
 In this statement to the United Nations, Clinton was rhetorically reconciling US and UN 
interests by stating that the United States has interests in the success of the United Nations. This 
interest in UN success is founded in both moral interests, such as “pursuing peace”, and also in 
more practical interests, such as cost sharing. Within the same speech to the UN, Clinton pushed 
back against the idealistic notion of UN peacekeeping: “If the American people are to say yes to 
UN peacekeeping, the United Nations must know when to say no.”51 The American emphasis on 
discrimination of intervention points to the need for individual case evaluation, as well as the 
flexibility allowed to the US within UN missions. While US foreign policy can run concurrent to 
UN interest, the two are not one in the same; and the United States will not be held hostage by 
the UN to act as the world’s policeman. Throughout statements given by the Clinton 
Administration one can see teetering between being invested in the ideological/moral 
considerations of peacekeeping and Humanitarian Intervention, and preserving agency within US 
foreign policy.52 At the same time, the US worked to make US interests into UN interests—as 
                                                          
50 Clinton, Bill, Alvin Z Rubinstein, Albina Shayevich, and Boris Zlotnikov. 2000. The Clinton Foreign Policy Reader : 
Presidential Speeches with Commentary. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe. P 18 
51 Clinton, Rubinstein, Shayevich, and Zlotnikov. The Clinton Foreign Policy Reader p. 19 
52 Clinton, Rubinstein, Shayevich, Zlotnikov. The Clinton Foreign Policy Reader; Scott and Crothers. “Out of the 
Cold.” P 4 
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can be seen by the American argument that withdrawing troops from Rwanda was moral as it 
would protect the reputation and viability of UN peace missions in the future—the US did not 
want to have to bear the costs of intervention in Rwanda, and therefore framed intervention in 
Rwanda as too costly for the UN as a whole.53 
 To speak about US foreign policy without mentioning domestic policy is missing part of 
the equation. US foreign policy creation does not occur in a vacuum, but rather occurs both 
within an international context (as highlighted through the role of the UN), as well as in the 
domestic context. Clinton’s election into the presidency gave him an electoral mandate based on 
prioritizing domestic issues over international issues.54 Daalder writes that the Clinton 
administration “chose to join its critics rather than defend its policy [of assertive multilateralism] 
believing that in so doing it could better protect its domestic political agenda.”55 If foreign policy 
creation is secondary to domestic policy creation, then it is not unreasonable to assume that 
domestic support might have more influence than in a foreign policy based administration, like 
in the Clinton Administration.56 There will also be a centripetal force exerted by domestic actors, 
such as Congress, to bring foreign policy back home, as seen in Congressional statements about 
foreign policy decisions. Similarly, the role of elections will also play a role in foreign policy 
creation if foreign policy has the potential to jeopardize the Administration. Domestic pull in 
American foreign policy can be seen by the creation and implementation of the PDD-25, which 
Daalder states was a way to keep Congress informed about US intervention.57  
                                                          
53 Power. “Bystanders to Genocide.” In The Atlantic. September 2001.  
54 Daalder. “Knowing When to Say No: The Development of US Policy for Peacekeeping” in UN Peacekeeping, 
American Politics, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s p 40 
55 Daalder “Knowing When to Say No.” p 60 
56 Ibid. pg 59 
57 Ibid. p 59; The creation, implementation, and impact of PDD-25 will be addressed in detail in the results section, 
as PDD-25 has been regarded as a way for the US to not intervene in Rwanda, and can be argued as a mechanism 
used by the US to help measure a reasonable chance of success. 
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In the book Ethical Foreign Policy: US Humanitarian Intervention, Chang discusses HI 
in Bosnia and Kosovo by the US during the Clinton Administration through a lens of moral 
leadership. Chang’s objective is to discuss how the US reacted to these cases, as well as to 
promote the idea that the US needs to take on moral leadership in the international arena.58 Due 
to the “humanitarian” aspect of HI, the notion of morality and selflessness is an integral part to 
the discussion. As aforementioned, the status quo of non-intervention is juxtaposed by the belief 
that if one can stop tragedies and crises, one should.  
In the article “What determines US humanitarian intervention?” Choi conducts a time-
series analysis of cases of humanitarian intervention across 153 countries from 1981-2005 and 
analyzes his data to determine explanations for humanitarian intervention.59 Choi’s research 
concludes that US humanitarian intervention pursues humanitarian objectives—such as helping 
those “who face starvation and death because of political violence.”60 This outcome supports the 
interpretation of Humanitarian Intervention in which intervention is done for its stated, 
humanitarian purpose—versus a political ploy to protect oil supply.61  
Brune and Joffe identify criteria for intervention to occur. While these criteria are broad 
enough to be universal, both authors focus specifically on US intervention. There are four Brune-
Joffe criteria for intervention: moral imperative for intervention, national interest, reasonable 
chance of success, and domestic support.62 In the next section, I will go into further detail about 
each of these criteria.  
                                                          
58 Chang, Chih-Hann. 2011. Ethical Foreign Policy? US Humanitarian Interventions: V.T.: Ashgate Publishing 
Company. Pg 3. 
59 Choi, Seung-Whan. 2013. "What determines US humanitarian intervention?"  Conflict Management and Peace 
Science 30 (2):121-139. Pg 121 
60 Choi, Seung-Whan. 2013. "What determines US humanitarian intervention?" pg 134.  
61 Ibid. p 130 
62 Brune. The United States and Post-Cold War Interventions: Bush and Clinton in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia, 1992-
1998. P 7-10; Joffe. “The New Europe: Yesterday’s Ghosts.” 
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Methods and Data Collection:  
 I have chosen case studies to allow me to look more closely at the factors leading to US 
humanitarian intervention. I chose the cases of the Bosnia, Croatia, Rwanda, and Somalia, as 
they all have associated UN missions. In my case selection, I went through a list of UN 
peacekeeping missions. Using UN missions associated with these interventions controls for 
international acceptability of intervention. 
I then excluded any case whose mission started before the 1990s or ended in the 2000s, 
as this would control for the Cold War, as well as post-9/11 considerations. From there, I then 
found UN documents that outlined member country contributions for each year by peacekeeping 
mission. Then I excluded UN observer missions since an observer mission does not fall within 
my definition of humanitarian intervention, I wanted to avoid these cases (see Appendix for chart 
of excluded UN missions). I then looked at whether the US militarily intervened or not by region 
of the world.  
 For each of these regions, I have an intervention and a non-intervention case. While I 
wanted to gain a more global perspective on US humanitarian intervention policy, I did not want 
to fall into the trap where the explanation for intervention or non-intervention was “it’s Europe” 
or “it’s Africa.” While regional differences can be important, and the United States’ relationships 
with each continent differs, I did not want my thesis to become reductionist.  
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In choosing my case studies, I also looked at HI literature and saw that the cases of 
Bosnia, Rwanda, and Somalia were prevalent. These cases fit into with my UN peacekeeping 
operations chart, as well. Bosnia and Somalia both experienced US intervention, while Rwanda 
did not. I saw in my chart that the US did not intervene in Croatia during UNCRO which initially 
sparked my interest in studying Croatia as a European non-intervention case. However, I also 
learned that the US did not become militarily involved in Croatia through UNPROFOR which 
would also act as a non-intervention case. I chose to look more at Croatia during UNPROFOR, 
UN Peace Operations 
Selection Chart UN Acronymn Name of Mission Location Years
Europe
Military Intervention (by US)
UNPROFOR UN Protection Force
Croatia, Bosnia-Herzgovina, Former 
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and 
Montenegro); Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia 1992-1995
UNPREDEP Preventative Deployment Force Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia1995-1999
UNTAES
Transitional Administration for Eastern 
Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium "Croatia" 1996-1998
 Non-Intervention (by US)
UNCRO Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia Croatia 1995-1996
UNCPSG Civil ian Police Support Group
Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and 
Western Sirmium Jan-Oct 1998
Africa
Military Intervention (by US)
ONUMOZ Operation in Mozambique Mozambique 1992-1994
UNOSOM II Operation in Somalia II Somalia 1993-95
Non-Intervention (by US)
UNAVEM II Angola Verification Mission II Angola 1991-95
UNOSOM I Operation in Somalia I Somalia 1992-1993
UNAVEM III Angola Verification Mission III Angola 1995-1997
UNOMUR Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda Uganda-Rwanda 1993-1994
UNAMIR Assistance Mission for Rwanda Rwanda 1993-1996
Asia
Military Intervention (by US)
UNAMIC Advanced Mission in Cambodia Cambodia 1991-1992
UNTAC UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia Cambodia 1992-1993
Non-Intervention (by US)
N/A
Latin America
Military Intervention (by US)
UNMIH Mission in Haiti Haiti 1993-1996
Non-Intervention (by US)
UNSMIH Support Mission in Haiti Haiti 1996-1997
MINUGAU Verification Mission in Guatemala Guatemala Jan-May 1997
UNTMIH Transition Mission in Haiti Haiti Aug-Dec 1997
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the UN intervention in Croatia at the beginning of the conflict (when UNPROFOR was there) 
appeared to be a more salient point in the conflict in my sources about the conflict in Croatia 
than later on during UNCRO.63  In the case of Somalia, UNITAF did not appear in my UN 
peacekeeping operations chart, but was mentioned extensively in the literature on Somalia as the 
turning point in US military involvement in Somalia. As can be seen through both the cases of 
Croatia and Somalia, the actual UN peacekeeping operation was less important in my case 
selection than the humanitarian crisis by country.  
One of the major considerations that needs to be taken into account within this thesis is 
the interaction between my case studies. To illustrate how one case, Somalia, has influenced later 
cases of Humanitarian Intervention, Chang states,  
The Somalia debacle had a significant effect on the [Clinton] administration’s subsequent 
military decisions such as the fear of ‘crossing the Mogadishu line’ in Bosnia. One of the 
direct effects of the Somalia disaster was America’s failure to support the UN 
peacekeeping force in Rwanda.64 
Chang is describing how the deaths in the Battle of Mogadishu in Somalia, and the backlash 
from this event, caused the United States to be more cautious when putting American soldiers’ 
lives in danger.65 While it is important to take these inter-case influences into consideration it is 
equally important to evaluate at each case separately, as to not reduce the policy creation for 
each separate case. On the one hand, the United States would evaluate its earlier intervention 
policy and results from that policy to inform itself about its policy creation for the next 
opportunity for humanitarian intervention. On the other hand, each humanitarian crisis had its 
                                                          
63 Burg and Shoup. Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention. p 83  
64 Chang. Ethical Foreign Policy? P 79 
65 Ibid. p. 78-79 
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own unique characteristics that the US would have had to take into consideration when deciding 
to intervene. As these cases were all taking place within the same time frame, it is impossible to 
fully separate the cases from each other. There is only so much time and resources that an 
administration can spend on an issue. This being said, I tried to keep the interconnectivity of the 
cases in mind during my analysis, but have decided to treat the cases as independent for the 
purposes of this thesis.  
As a good example of interconnectivity of cases, the Brune-Joffe criteria for reasonable 
chance of success would be informed by both the interplay between cases, as well as by each 
case’s individual characteristics. A policy maker would look both at the successes and obstacles 
of previous cases, but would also need to understand the nature of the specific conflict at which 
he was looking: how fighting was taking place, terrain, etc.66  
I created two charts as organizational tools to show both the individuality of each case, as 
well as illustrate the interaction between cases. My first chart provides a side-by-side comparison 
of what was occurring in each of my case studies, as well as selected US domestic events, by 
year starting in 1990 and going through 1996 (see Appendix for timeline). This chart allows me 
to see the events of these years simultaneously, and to better understand how these events were 
unfolding as they were occurring, as none of these events happened in isolation. An example of 
interplay between the cases of possible intervention would be the Mogadishu effect. Sources 
such as DiPrizio and Power describe how the failure in Somalia impacted the US decision to not 
intervene in Rwanda.67 
                                                          
66 Joffe. “The New Europe: Yesterday’s Ghosts.” These influences in reasonable chance of success was outlined in 
Joffe’s article through the example of intervention in the Gulf War versus intervention in Bosnia.  
67 DiPrizio. Armed Humanitarians. P 75, 85; Power. “Bystanders to Genocide.” 
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As a way to focus my analysis of my case studies, I have used Joffe’s criteria for 
intervention, along with Brune’s interpretation and expansion of Joffe’s criteria to look at US 
humanitarian intervention.68 In Brune’s book he discusses how Bosnia and Somalia fit within the 
intervention criteria. I will complete an analysis of my case studies independent of Brune’s 
research and compare my findings with his. Likewise, in my cases of non-intervention in 
Rwanda and Croatia, I believe it is important to see whether these criteria would hold for the 
United States’ decision making process to not intervene. The Brune-Joffe69 criteria are as 
follows:  
1) There is a moral imperative for action 
2) There is a national interest involved, especially if military action is included 
3) There is a reasonable chance of success 
4) The intervening state has full domestic support70 
Brune goes into further detail to define what these criteria, and then applied them to the cases of 
Somalia, Bosnia, and Haiti.71  
In describing moral imperative, Brune states that “To encourage democracy, Joffe 
believes that the U.S. and other nations must protect human rights and civilized standards of 
moral behavior.”72 In this interpretation of moral imperative, which I will be using, Brune is 
suggesting that moral imperative for action is a mix of the purely humanitarian interest in 
                                                          
68 Joffe. “The New Europe: Yesterday’s Ghosts.”; Brune. The United States and Post-Cold War Interventions. 
69 Joffe presents the four criteria initially, however they are mentioned more in the discussion of Kuwait and 
Bosnia than as criteria themselves. Brune takes Joffe’s criteria and expands on them, and applies this criteria to 
Somalia, Bosnia, and Haiti. Due to Brune’s more expansive discussion, I have placed his name first in the joint name 
for the criteria.  
70 Brune. The United States and Post-Cold War Interventions. P. 6-7; Joffe. “The New Europe: Yesterday’s Ghosts.” 
71 Brune. The United States and Post-Cold War Interventions. P. 6-10 
72 Ibid. p 7 
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protecting human rights with the belief that action in these cases will uphold international 
commitments, as it will raise standards of “moral behavior.” Examples of international 
commitments that reflect international norms on human rights include the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (UDHR) and the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide (Genocide Convention). I will be focusing on these international commitments, as 
they are pertinent to my case studies. As these human rights are laid out in concrete 
commitments, they add weight to the violation of those rights, and allowing those violations to 
occur—as seen in the case of Rwanda in which the US avoided calling the crisis a genocide.73 In 
my discussion of moral imperative, I would also like to include the caveat of the magnitude of 
human rights violations. As human rights violations frequently happen across the world, there 
must be a level in which human rights violations are so egregious that third party actors 
intervene. In explaining the moral imperative for action, Brune also ties this criterion with 
national interest, specifically in the case of military intervention. Brune explains, “Joffe says 
‘purely humanitarian’ reasons for military intervention are insufficient unless the conflict 
threatens the perceived national interest of the U.S. or other states” (original emphasis).74  
National interest in Brune’s explanation included items such as preventing and stopping 
regional instability and refugee crises, as well as protecting valuable resources like oil.75 
Regional instability and refugee crises are byproducts of humanitarian crises that impact nations 
outside of the area of conflict. Refugees go into other countries, and can cause strain on the host 
nation (as seen with the European reaction to the Syrian refugee crisis). Likewise, regional 
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instability can impact political and economic ties. While natural resources are an important 
consideration, none of the cases I am researching are in possession of valuable natural resources. 
Reasonable chance of success is obviously a major influence in the decision-making 
process by the United States to intervene. In my case studies, I will speak to the role of the 
Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25, and how the criteria outlined by this policy could be 
seen as an attempt by the United States to more thoroughly evaluate the reasonable chance of 
success in an intervention. I will argue that the United States used American led command and 
control in cases of humanitarian intervention as a way to increase its chance of success.  
The fourth criterion of intervention, full domestic support, came with the caveat that 
domestic support is not necessarily required before intervention, as long as public support can be 
won back after intervention has been initiated.76 When discussing domestic support, I will look at 
both public opinion polls, as well as the role of Congress. Livingston argues that the CNN effect 
does not create specific policy or force riskier policy, but can exert pressure upon the 
administration to take action.77 I believe that both public opinion and Congressional opinion are 
important, as both exert domestic influence.  
The second chart I created illustrates how each case conforms or deviates from the 
Brune-Joffe criteria for intervention. By looking at the Brune-Joffe criteria, I will be able to 
distinguish how each case individually meets the criteria. While earlier cases, such as Somalia, 
obviously impact decision-making for later cases, it is reductionist to only explain decision-
making by the US based on earlier experiences. Cases, such as Rwanda and Haiti both occurred 
after Somalia, however Rwanda was a case of non-intervention, while Haiti was a case of 
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intervention—which highlights the individuality of each case.78 The Brune-Joffe criteria chart is 
on page 53 at the end of the results section.  
 
Hypothesis: 
Drawing from the literature on humanitarian intervention, why states intervene, and US 
foreign policy, I believe that moral imperative for intervention and national interest are necessary 
for US humanitarian intervention.  
I also believe that while moral imperative is necessary, it is not a sufficient criteria for 
intervention.  
 
Results: 
 In my results, I found that the Brune-Joffe criteria for intervention were a good measure 
for cases of US humanitarian intervention. However, Somalia has proven to challenge to my 
hypothesis that moral imperative is necessary but not sufficient. In the case of Somalia, there 
were no major national interests identified at the time to necessitate US intervention.79 However, 
it should be noted that Somalia was considered strategically important during the Cold War and 
received military and economic aid from the US.80 While piracy has been an issue in the Horn of 
Africa, the securitization of the Horn of Africa or surrounding waters was proposed as a US 
interest. However, Choi writes that intervention in Somalia has been cited by realists as a case in 
                                                          
78 DiPrizio. Armed Humanitarians. 
79 Ibid. P 52-53 
80 Schraeder. “From Ally to Orphan.” P 331-332 
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which humanitarianism was claimed to justify intervention “for the purpose of exporting 
values.”81  
 While the intervention in Bosnia was delayed from the initial onset of violence to US 
intervention through NATO humanitarian intervention starting in 1993 with the enforcement of a 
no fly zone over Bosnia, national interest was established through the importance of European-
American relations.82 Intervention in Somalia does experience mission creep, as the UN mission 
in Somalia initially started as humanitarian aid to alleviate the starvation, then moved to 
involving protecting aid routes to disposing war lords. Unlike Bosnia, however, intervention in 
Somalia does not adopt a national interest during the conflict, but rather is considered for 
intervention early on outside of national interest. The Bush Administration became involved in 
the Somalian crisis due to humanitarian reasons, versus national interests. Finnemore writes that 
Somalia was outside of American national interests. She states that the US no longer had security 
interests in Somalia, and the base that the US once occupied became obsolete due to 
technological advances.83 However, the moral imperative for intervention based on mass 
starvation could be interpreted on a lower magnitude of human rights violations versus ethnic 
cleansing or genocide. The Balkan cases both exhibited ethnic cleansing and although the US did 
participate in HI in Bosnia, it was delayed. The US did not provide any humanitarian 
intervention in Rwanda although there was a genocide occurring.  
 
Somalia: 
                                                          
81 Choi. “What determines US humanitarian intervention?” p 125. After following Choi’s sources on this statement, 
I was unable to find where this argument was presented. Likewise, I was unable to determine what “values” were 
being referred to (oil or something else).  
82 Burg and Shoup. Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention. p 140 
83 Finnemore. “Changing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention.” p 498 
McGrath 27 
 
 The mass starvation in Somalia that triggered humanitarian intervention in 1992 stemmed 
from the Somali civil war that had escalated from a guerilla insurgency.84 In 1991, President Siad 
Barre was “forced out of power by a coalition of opposition forces [which] caused it to implode 
into clan-based civil war.”85 Opposition forces were only held together through their common 
enemy, the Siad Barre government, which had been defeated.86 The clan-based opposition forces 
included the Somali National Movement (SNM), the United Somali Congress (USC), and the 
Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM).87 The rejection of the Djibouti Accords in June-July, 1991 to 
resolve the conflict, led to an intensification of the civil war causing “massive flow of refugees 
and severe food shortages,” to which the US responded through the UN missions to Somalia.88 
 At the time of the food crisis in 1991-1992, Somalia was not considered a strategic area 
for the United States, however during the Cold War, the United States was allied with Somalia as 
a hedge against the influence of communism in Africa. The close relationship between Somalia 
and the US was established in the 1970s by the Carter Administration.89 In the 1980s, the US 
provided military and economic aid to Somalia, in return for “access to air and seaport 
facilities.”90 However the emergence of the guerilla insurgency against the government in the 
1980s led to the US distancing itself from Somalia, as there were “rising concerns with the 
growing atrocities of the Siad regime” and Somalia was no longer seen as important due to the 
ending of the Cold War.91 
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In the case of humanitarian intervention in Somalia, UN intervention was first established 
through UNOSOM I (UN Mission in Somalia). Operation Provide Relief (OPR) was the 
American food aid contingent of UNOSOM I with the goal to airlift food supplies to starving 
Somalis.92 OPR was expanded to Operation Restore Hope in December, 1992, in which the 
United States secured safe routes for food aid distributed within the country and was operated 
under the United Task Force (UNITAF) which was sanctioned by the UNSC Resolution 794.93 
UNSC Resolution 814 marked the end of UNITAF and the start of UNOSOM II and Operation 
Continue Hope. Resolution 814 marked an increase in military involvement as nation-building 
became a part of the stated mission.94 From international intervention through UNITAF and 
UNOSOM II missions, the goal of intervention transitioned from providing food aid to state 
building.  
On October 3-4, 1993, “ninety-six U.S. soldiers were killed and wounded, a U.S. 
helicopter pilot was taken hostage, and the naked corpse of a U.S. soldier was desecrated and 
dragged through the streets” in the Battle of Mogadishu. The Battle of Mogadishu caused the 
Clinton Administration to pull US troops out of Somalia.95 
The moral imperative for intervention was established by the mass starvation experienced 
by Somalis, and was the reason cited by the Bush Administration for why the United States 
should become involved in Somalia.96 Brune writes that “Television supplied a moral imperative 
and the public support for Bush’s decision to intervene”.97 This finding is supported by DiPrizio 
who notes the increased level of media attention on Somalia, and the UN’s failure to adequately 
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respond to the humanitarian crisis there.98 DiPrizio also notes that Bush was personally affected 
by the cable “A Day in Hell” from the US Ambassador in Kenya about Somalia.99 When 
analyzing moral imperative as intervention would protect against violations of international 
norms and agreements such as Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the starvation of Somalis 
can be seen as a moral imperative that extends past human compassion. The first point of Article 
25 of the UDHR states that “Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health 
and well-being of himself and of his family, including food…”100 If the US was following the 
UDHR, then intervention in the humanitarian crisis in Somalia could be justified by the notion 
that starvation is a violation of human rights. However, one might question whether the 
magnitude of starvation was strong enough for intervention, when compared to other human 
rights violations such as ethnic cleansing or genocide.  
National interest was deemed not applicable in the case of Somalia by authors such as 
DiPrizio, as well as Joffe and Brune themselves. Joffe writes that in Somalia “the absence of 
strategic interest was compensated by the conviction that order could be restored at close-to-zero 
cost in U.S. lives within a very short period of time.”101 In many ways, Somalia seems to be an 
outlier within major US cases of humanitarian intervention. Unlike Bosnia or Rwanda where 
major human rights violations were occurring due to violence perpetrated on civilians (during a 
civil war), the humanitarian crisis of starvation in Somalia occurred as a by-product of the civil 
war.102 Although refugees were an issue in the Somali conflict, the refugee crisis there was far 
from American soil, unlike the refugee crisis in Haiti in 1994.103  
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Brune contradicts the Brune-Joffe criteria in his discussion of intervention in Somalia. In 
the criteria, Brune explains that military intervention must be supported by national interests, not 
merely humanitarian interests.104 However, in his discussion of intervention in Somalia, he states 
that the United States adopted a “strictly humanitarian mission” as “the [Bush] administration 
perceived no national interest at stake in Somalia, President Bush seriously qualified the role of 
the U.S.’s mission.”105  
One could argue that national interest operated in an abstract capacity through the idea of 
credibility. President George H W Bush had placed some of his credibility on the idea of a New 
World Order, as well as through the kind of legacy he wanted to leave.106 Conflict in Somalia 
could be seen as a threat to Bush’s credibility. The notion of credibility spans both personal and 
national levels, and it is difficult to classify its role in foreign policy creation. Additionally, 
intervention in Somalia resolved domestic pressure and criticism from Muslim nations for not 
intervening in Bosnia.107 Bush’s decision to participate in humanitarian intervention in Somalia 
could also reflect how he saw the United States’ role in peace operations as a whole. Hirsch 
writes, “Though he did not relate it to Somalia directly, in his October address to the UN General 
Assembly, Bush announced that the U.S. military would have a new and more active role in 
peacekeeping efforts in the ‘new world order’ and that the Pentagon needed to prepare for it.”108 
While perhaps this statement was just rhetoric, Bush’s address to the UN General Assembly 
could possibly have been a reflection of how Bush imagined the world order at the end of the 
Cold War. DiPrizio states that Bush’s Somalia policy seemed to match his rhetoric of moral 
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imperative, which could perhaps bolster the notion that Bush believed in a new world after the 
Cold War and imagined the US playing an active role in creating that order. However, 
intervention in Somalia did not appear to intersect with national interest.109 The US was 
interested in Somalia during the Cold War, but had been backing out of the country by the time 
violence broke out in Somalia.110  
Reasonable chance of success was present in Somalia. Joffe claims that the lack of 
national interest was compensated by the high chance of success with low costs to the US.111 
When presented with various policy options for intervention in Somalia, Bush chose the most 
interventionist of the policy options.112 However, Schraeder describes how this policy option was 
not favored by the Pentagon.113 On December 4, 1992, Bush announced a military operation that 
would create a secure environment in Somalia “for the distribution of famine relief aid” which 
became UNITAF through the UNSC Resolution 794.114 UNITAF was under US command and 
control. As an integral part of UNITAF, the US could have more control in the operation, which 
would make the US more comfortable with the chances of success within a military operation in 
Somalia. In Christopher Landsberg’s chapter on US foreign policy within Africa, he states, “The 
initial phase of U.S.-UN involvement in the humanitarian operation in Somalia was widely 
judged successful.”115 While intervention in Somalia is seen as a failure due to the effects of the 
Battle of Mogadishu and the pulling out of US forces from Somalia, at the time of the 
intervention, a humanitarian operation was not destined to doom. Chang notes that in comparison 
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to intervention in Bosnia, intervention in Somalia was considered “doable.”116 Perhaps the case 
of Somalia begs the question of how mission creep influences chances of success, however 
mission creep does not account for the policy creation for intervention in itself.  
Somalia provides a look at both positive and negative domestic support for humanitarian 
intervention. The Bush administration had domestic and congressional pressure to “do 
something” in Somalia.117 The House of Representatives in the 102nd and 103rd Congresses 
passed resolutions stating that the dire situation in Somalia and pressuring the UN to take action 
within Somalia.118 Similarly, Schraeder described the congressional pressure the Bush 
Administration felt to “do something” and the high level of support for Operation Restore Hope 
(UNITAF) by the public.119 Durch notes that at the beginning of UNITAF’s mission in Somalia, 
there was strong domestic support for the mission, with 70 percent of those polled by New York 
Times/CBS agreeing that UN mission in Somalia was “worth the possible loss of American 
lives.”120 However, the possibility of losing lives is less painful than the actual loss of lives. 
After the Battle of Mogadishu in October 1993 there were “congressional demands for the 
immediate withdrawal of U.S. troops” from Somalia, with the Clinton Administration receiving 
criticism from both sides of the aisle.121 Likewise, Schraeder noted the falling public opinion 
regarding US intervention in Somalia with the low approval rating of Clinton’s handling of the 
Somali crisis at 31 percent.122 While Joffe and Brune dictate that there needs to be domestic 
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support for intervention to be undertaken, I would venture to state that domestic support must be 
sustained at a high enough level to allow intervention to continue.  
If one applies the Brune-Joffe criteria to the case of intervention in Somalia, one can see 
that Somalia does exhibit all factors for intervention. However, in order for Somalia to fit within 
the Brune-Joffe criteria, the issue of national interest must be interpreted in a wide sense, as 
national interest may be divorced from the location or details of the conflict, as long as 
intervention in the crisis fulfills national interest. While this interpretation of national interest 
may appear to be too abstract, this interpretation of national interest can also help explain 
intervention in Bosnia.  
 
The Former Yugoslavia: 
 In order to understand the US response to Bosnia and Croatia, it is important to provide 
context into how the two cases overlap, and are differentiated from one another. Bosnia and 
Croatia were two republics within the six-republic federation of Socialist Yugoslavia, and were 
the two republics in which fighting during the civil war was most concentrated. On June 25, 
1991, Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence from Yugoslavia, which resulted in the 
“10 day war” between Slovenia and the JNA (Yugoslav Army).123 Fighting in Croatia broke out 
in August 1990 that continued until the cease-fire put in place in January 1992.124 The move 
towards recognition of Croatia and Slovenia placed Bosnia in a precarious situation within the 
dissolution of Yugoslavia.125 Violence erupted in Bosnia in April 1992 after Bosnian 
independence was recognized.126 The UNSC authorized a peace operation into the disintegrating 
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Yugoslavia called UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR).127 UNPROFOR’s mandate was 
expanded to cover Bosnia as well as Croatia, after the occupation of the Sarajevo airport through 
UNSC Resolution 770 in 1992, and was then expanded further to include “monitoring airfields” 
and “to implement the ‘no fly zone.’”128 Burg and Shoup write that “International concern over 
the upcoming [independence] referendum [in Bosnia] began to surface in February [1992]. The 
UN decided in early February to establish the head-quarters for the UNPROFOR operation in 
Croatia in Sarajevo, out of concern over developments in Bosnia.”129 This statement illustrates 
forethought by the UN, as a way to react to potential violence in Bosnia.  
 While Bosnia and Croatia started as two republics within the same federal government, 
they should not be treated as one case study. Due to the fracturing nature of Yugoslavia, as well 
as international recognition of both Bosnia and Croatia by the European Community (EC) and 
the US, Bosnia and Croatia became two independent states. The EC recognized Croatia as an 
independent state in January 1992, and recognized Bosnia on April 6, 1992.130 The United States 
recognized Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia as independent states on April 6, 1992, as well. 131 
Violence appeared to be quelled in Croatia after the gaining international recognition, as 
recognition of Croatia appeared to work, it was assumed by Western powers that it would quell 
violence in Bosnia as well.132 While the beginning set of events for Bosnia and Croatia were 
parallel, the internal dynamics of each state differed regarding levels of violence, perpetrators 
and victims, as well as ethnic constitution of each state. 
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 Burg and Shoup describe the brutality in ethnic cleansing (specifically mentioning ethnic 
cleansing perpetrated by the Serbs, as it was better documented) as women were raped, and men 
and boys were killed or interned.133 They describe that ethnic cleansing expelled people from 
their homes, “Muslim women and children were usually forced across the battle lines into 
Bosnian territory or transported out of Bosnia to the Sandzak, and even on occasion to 
Macedonia.”134 Likewise, Burg and Shoup note that “The Serb campaign of ethnic cleansing 
established a pattern that was to be followed on other occasions and by other groups throughout 
the war, but nowhere else on such a large scale” as in April, May and June 1992 in eastern 
Bosnia.135 
 
Croatia: 
 The cases of Bosnia and Croatia started on the same trajectory, due to the way that the 
conflict grew and spread in the breakup of Yugoslavia. A question which is then presented is 
why was intervention taken in Bosnia but not Croatia? 
 The humanitarian crisis in Croatia did fulfill the Brune-Joffe criteria for moral 
imperative, as there was ethnic cleansing. Beyond the UDHR violation of non-discrimination (as 
the conflict in Croatia was based on ethnicity), the conflict in Croatia also violated the UDHR 
articles 13 and 15 which state that all humans are entitled to the right of free movement and 
residence, and the right to a nationality respectively.136 Ethnic cleansing violates articles 13 and 
15, as it forces the movement of people, as well as aims to create an ethnically pure state in 
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which other ethnicities are unwelcome—infringing on a person’s right to belong to have a 
nationality.  
Although ethnic cleansing and other atrocities did occur in Croatia, the magnitude of 
violence was less than in Bosnia. Articles published from 1991-1993 in the New York Times 
talked about the conflict in Croatia, however, there were no major cries for US intervention into 
the conflict.137 There were concerns that Croatia was taking a cue from Milosevic in his violent 
tactics, and that Croatia was returning to its anti-Semitic past under the fascist “Ustasha” of 
World War II.138 The moral imperative for action was also lessened by the relative success of 
diplomatic efforts in Croatia. Durch and Shear place estimates of early casualties in Croatia at 
6,000-10,000 people.139 The number of casualties helps measure the magnitude of moral 
imperative. In September 25, 1991, the UNSC passed Resolution 713 which expanded the EC’s 
weapons embargo on Yugoslavia to all UN members in reaction to the violence that broke out in 
Slovenia and Croatia.140 Diplomatic and economic intervention (as sanctions both have a 
political statement as well as impact economics) were taken in the Croatian conflict as a way to 
try to mitigate the atrocities there.141 Beginning in October 1991, and more forcefully in 
November 1991, the town of Vukovar in Croatia was besieged by, and fell to the Yugoslav 
National Army (JNA), which “marked the high-tide of the Serbian campaign in Croatia.”142 In 
November, 1991, Cyrus Vance, the UN negotiator, announced a ceasefire between the Croatian 
Forces and the Yugoslav Army (JNA), which was implemented in March and April 1992.143 
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Diplomatic intervention by the EC played a large role in the Croatia, especially at the beginning 
of the conflict. Europe wanted to play a dominant role in the Yugoslav crisis, as it wanted to 
assert its ability to manage European affairs, as well as legitimize the EC as it was moving to 
become the European Union.144 Diplomatic and economic efforts included mediation by Lord 
Carrington as a representative for the EC, which was followed by UNSC Resolution 713 which 
placed an arms embargo over Yugoslavia.145 
 As Europe was trying to take the lead on the Yugoslav crisis, and the US had other 
foreign policy priorities, such as the Gulf War, the US had no reason to stretch itself thinner 
when it was not direly needed in the Balkans. The need for US/NATO intervention in Bosnia 
would become necessary later. If American interest in the Balkans was to support its allies, and 
support NATO, then this national interest did not exist in Croatia as the European Community 
and the UN were able to intervene diplomatically and economically with some level of success 
in Croatia. The United States would have had national interest in regional stability within the 
Balkans, however the conflict in Croatia was not strong enough to invoke US military 
humanitarian intervention.  
 Diplomatic and economic interventions in Croatia were fairly successful. While there was 
violence that broke out in Croatia, the conflict that broke out in Bosnia a few months later was 
much more violent, which proved to be unable to be easily reduced by economic and diplomatic 
measures.  
 The evaluation of reasonable chances of success and domestic support were less 
important in the case of Croatia, as the violence, moral imperative for action, and national 
interest did not reach a level in which the United States would send its own troops to militarily 
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assist in humanitarian intervention there. The United States was happy to take a backseat role in 
Yugoslavia as it did not want to get involved in Yugoslavia directly or through NATO.146 As 
mentioned in the small sample of New York Times articles from 1991 to 1993, there were not 
strong calls by the media for US intervention in Croatia.147 
 
Bosnia: 
 Bosnia, as a case of international intervention, provides a look at both non-intervention 
and intervention. Bosnia is a case of non-intervention for military humanitarian intervention up 
until the point in which the international community, meaning the UN, as well as the US and 
Europe (through NATO) participated militarily in the country in 1993.148 There was intervention 
within the former Yugoslavia, through diplomatic means, and UNPROFOR was deployed in 
Croatia to monitor the ceasefire between the Croats and the Serbs.149 UNPROFOR’s mandate 
was expanded by the UN on June 5, 1992 from Croatia into Bosnia as well.150 However, the EC 
and US were hesitant to intervene militarily into Bosnia. Joffe writes that the when posed with 
the question of whether to become more involved in Bosnia, that European nations felt that “the 
unspoken answer was: in the absence of compelling interest and without the chance of a quick 
and easy success, we [Europe] will not intervene, even though this war ought to be our war…”151 
While speaking of Europe’s hesitancy, Joffe places Bosnia firmly within his own framework of a 
case in which humanitarian intervention would not be undertaken. However, as the presence of 
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humanitarian intervention later on proves, the major obstacles that Joffe presented, including the 
difficulty of fighting in Bosnia, did not stop the policy creation for intervention later.152 
As briefly outlined in the previous section about the former Yugoslavia, the conflict in 
Bosnia initially started as the secession of Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia from Yugoslavia, then 
the conflict quickly devolved into a civil war within Bosnia. In July 1995, 8000 men and boys 
were massacred in the safe area of Srebrenica.153 An increase in violence in Bosnia led to a more 
active NATO role in the Bosnian conflict, as NATO started bombing Serb command and control 
centers.154  
Moral imperative was established in Bosnia due to the violence of the conflict, as well as 
the presence of ethnic cleansing. Chang quotes President Clinton stating that “The principle of 
ethnic cleansing is something we ought to stand up against.”155 As discussed when describing the 
Brune-Joffe criteria, moral imperative means that there should be a human rights motivation, 
paired with the belief that action would protect international norms. Similarly to the 
humanitarian crisis in Croatia, ethnic cleansing in Bosnia could be categorized as a human rights 
violation under the UDHR.156 While the moral imperative between Bosnia and Croatia was 
similar in many aspects, the magnitude and severity of human rights violations was higher in 
Bosnia. In August 1992, the Bosnian Serbs “under international pressure, opened some of its 
detention camps to Western journalists.”157 The exposure of these detention camps in Bosnia 
brought back memories of the Holocaust and the atrocities of World War II. In his address 
regarding the American role in the Dayton Accords, President Clinton addressed the parallel of 
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the atrocities in Bosnia to the Holocaust.158 The parallel between the two atrocities highlighted 
the poignancy of human rights violations in Bosnia. Likewise, specific episodes of atrocities in 
Bosnia, such as the breadline massacre in May 1992, made Western powers feel that they needed 
to “do something” to stop the atrocities in Bosnia.159  
Humanitarian intervention in the case of Bosnia illustrated how the perception of national 
interests changed. Brune states that “Although war crime reports in the Balkans provided a moral 
imperative for U.S. intervention, President Bush, and later President Clinton, initially tolerated 
the atrocities because no vital U.S. national interests were deemed to be present.”160 Joffe and 
Brune emphasize that the moral imperative for action is not enough to garner humanitarian 
intervention, but rather there must be national interests involved—or at least the semblance of 
national interests. The creation of US foreign policy regarding humanitarian intervention can be 
seen as a decision-making process made under the influence of a scarcity of resources, in which 
the US cannot physically or morally be the world’s policeman, meaning that moral imperative 
cannot be the only criteria as the US would then be involved in many conflicts.161   
The Bush Administration supported European efforts to provide peace in Bosnia, 
however did not become deeply involved itself. DiPrizio writes that the US was not deeply 
involved in the Balkans as the Middle East and Persian Gulf were higher priorities to the Bush 
Administration, and that the Administration left their European allies to wielding their influence 
in the region.162 The early American response to the humanitarian crisis in Bosnia reflected the 
low national interest in the Bosnian crisis. Operating in a world of limited time and resources, 
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prioritization was necessary by the Bush and Clinton Administrations. Chang writes that the 
Bush Administration was feeling pressure from Muslim countries to intervene on behalf of a 
Muslim nation, as the US had attacked Iraq in the Gulf War. Somalia and Bosnia were seen as 
two options for the Bush Administration and Somalia was chosen as the doable intervention.163 If 
Somalia was chosen to fulfill this national interest, then there would not be a need to intervene in 
Bosnia, as the intervention in Somalia would have already fulfilled the national interest need.    
As Joffe’s analysis of non-intervention in Bosnia illustrates, initially there was a belief 
that Bosnia did not fall within the category of strategic national interests, and there was a low 
possibility for success due to the guerilla nature of fighting, and the intermixing of combatants in 
Bosnia.164 DiPrizio also notes the lack of national interests, as he quoted Bush’s Secretary of 
State, James Baker, that the US did not have a dog in the Bosnian fight.165 In order for 
humanitarian intervention in Bosnia to become a viable policy option, there needed to be a 
reframing of US interest in Bosnia.  
While national interests were not apparent at the beginning of the conflict, national 
interests were invoked in speeches later on in the conflict. On November 27, 1995, President 
Clinton addressed the nation from the White House regarding the importance of supporting the 
Dayton Accords in Bosnia.166 In this speech, Clinton outlined that the US had interest in stopping 
the bloodshed of civilians in Bosnia while “at the same time, to bring stability to Central Europe, 
a region of the world that is vital to our national interests.”167 The stability of Central Europe 
                                                          
163 Chang. Ethnical Foreign Policy? p 74 
164 Joffe. “The New Europe: Yesterday’s Ghosts?” 
165 DiPrizio. Armed Humanitarians. p 119 
166 Clinton. “The Dayton Accords: Imposing Peace for Bosnia.” In The Clinton Foreign Policy Reader. p.174-179 
167 Ibid. p 174 
McGrath 42 
 
places the Bosnian conflict within a historical relationship between the US and Europe; therefore 
the emphasis on US-European relations can be seen as an understandable interest. 
Secretary of State Warren Christopher in 1993 stated that the US was motivated to 
intervene in the Bosnian conflict due to humanitarian reasons, but moreover aimed to prevent a 
“greater Balkan war.”168 This statement reveals the United States concern over possible regional 
instability due to the conflict in Bosnia. As the US would have witnessed how conflict in 
Slovenia and Croatia spilled into Bosnia, it is understandable that the US would have been 
concerned at a greater destabilization of the Balkans, especially as the magnitude of violence in 
Bosnia was greater than in Slovenia or Croatia.  
However, the American interest in Bosnia could be interpreted as interest in Europe 
beyond the conflict in the Balkans. Burg and Shoup state that “four of the seven U.S. interests in 
the war defined by President Clinton, in 1994 involved relations with Europe and NATO; none 
concerned the substance of the conflict itself.”169 Burg and Shoup also discuss the US interest of 
employing NATO within the Bosnian conflict as a way to keep Russia out of decision making 
regarding the use of force.170 The US interest in keeping Russia out of deliberations could be 
seen in connection to a reasonable chance of success. By keeping the decision making of whether 
to use US forces being outside Russia’s influence, the US may have felt more secure in its 
participation in Humanitarian Intervention.  
Although Joffe asserted that there would be a low chance for success in Bosnia due to the 
nature of the conflict, the Clinton Administration did believe that there would be a reasonable 
chance of success if they did send troops into Bosnia. US policy makers wrote three drafts of the 
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Presidential Decision Directive-25 (PDD-25), in July 1993, September 1993, and the final 
version in signed on May 3, 1994. PDD-25 was written to provide clear criteria for intervention 
in UN missions.171 The final version was signed on May 3, 1994—before the major NATO 
Operation Deliberate Force in August 1995.172 One of the criteria in place was that US forces 
were under US command within UN missions.173 US use of NATO in the Bosnian conflict would 
have allowed the US to feel and be in more control of American troops, which could be seen as a 
way to increase the reasonable chance of success. Burg and Shoup discuss the feeling by US 
policy makers that US intervention was inevitable. They state that the US believed that if the UN 
were to withdraw from Bosnia that the US would have to deploy ground troops. Given this belief 
of inevitable intervention, Burg and Shoup claim that the US wanted to intervene under the best 
circumstances, rather than waiting for the UN mission to fail.174 The US may have not only been 
trying to influence reasonable chance of success by trying to influence under what conditions it 
would enter Bosnia by choosing its own timeline, versus being forced into intervention to clean 
up a possible failed UN mission. Likewise, NATO presence in Bosnia could have eased possible 
American concerns about success, as a NATO contingency could have allowed for more US 
control.  
Domestic support for intervention in Bosnia did not appear to be too strong. Burg and 
Shoup discuss the roll of public opinion about the wars in Yugoslavia from 1993 to 1995. They 
stated that “Surveys conducted through 1993 revealed that relatively small proportions of the 
public were following the events closely, and that those who felt the United States had a 
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responsibility to do something about the fighting were far outnumbered by those who felt it did 
not.”175 Burg and Shoup also note that in November 1993, American public opinion placed the 
war in Bosnia behind other political issues from drug trafficking issues to “strengthening the 
domestic economy.”176 The American public continued to believe that the US did not have a 
responsibility to act in Bosnia with 62 percent agreeing in November 1994, and 64 percent 
agreeing in June 1995.177 However, Burg and Shoup did state that in June 1995, “71 percent did 
support using U.S. forces to defend peacekeepers if they were to come under attack.”178 The 
authors noted that while public opinion may not have pressured US policy makers directly, that 
media coverage of the conflict in itself pressured policymakers to “do something” regardless of 
what the actual policy would be.179 
Congress also played a role in US decision making regarding intervention into the 
Bosnian crisis. In Clinton’s proposed policy of “lift and strike,” which was adopted in spring 
1993 (but later reduced to safe areas), the United States would have lifted the arms embargo on 
Bosnia, allowing Bosniaks to receive arms and training, coupled with airstrikes.180 When trying 
to garner support for this policy, the Clinton Administration was warned that if the US were to 
get involved in Bosnia, the “United States must not lose.”181 Similarly, President Clinton was 
warned by a Democratic leader that negative outcomes in Bosnia would negatively impact 
Clinton’s “domestic political advantage.”182 After the Bosnian Serbs rejected the Contact Group 
plan, the US Senate passed two non-binding measures directing the President to lift arms 
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sanctions on Bosnia.183 This action by the Senate illustrates how domestic support in the US 
started to swing towards a more interventionist policy in Bosnia.  
When one applies the Brune-Joffe criteria to the case of Bosnia, one can see that the 
humanitarian crisis met the criterion of moral imperative through human rights violations 
through ethnic cleansing, and Bosnian Serb detention camps. Likewise, the Bosnian crisis 
fulfilled national interest as the conflict in Bosnia was redefined as protecting relations with 
Europe. The United States tried to secure a reasonable chance of success through the utilization 
of NATO in air strikes. Similarly, the US attempted to secure a reasonable chance of success by 
deciding its own timeframe for intervention, rather than being forced into intervention by a 
failure of the UN peace operation. Domestic support for intervention in Bosnia was rather low 
when looking at polling data, but by 1995, there was movement towards employing US force in 
Bosnia, if only to protect UN peacekeepers. Likewise, Congressional support for intervention in 
Bosnia appeared low when President Clinton presented the “lift and strike” policy, but became 
more interventionist by the time the Contact Group started to play a larger role in the conflict.  
  
Rwanda: 
In the spring into the summer of 1994, Hutu militants conducted genocide against the 
Tutsi minority in Rwanda. From 1990 to 1993, there were separate instances of Tutsis being 
killed by Hutu militants.184 On August 4, 1993, the Arusha Accords were signed into place as a 
power sharing agreement between the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and the Rwandan 
government as a way to stop the violence that had been growing in Rwanda.185 Underlying the 
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conflict between the RPF and the Rwandan government was the ethnic makeup of each of these 
groups. The RPF was majority Tutsi, while the Rwandan government was Hutu.186 The UN 
Assistance Mission for Rwanda, UNAMIR, “was charged with overseeing the implementation of 
the accords and military observers from the Organization of African Unity monitored 
ceasefire.”187  
As Vik notes, there was push back from President Juvenal Habyarimana’s supporters, 
who promoted Hutu superiority, against the Arusha Accords, as the accords ended the 
president’s hegemonic rule over Rwanda.188 The UN published a report a week after the Arusha 
Accords were signed warning of a possible genocide.189 Habyarimana’s plane was shot down on 
April 6, 1994, and the president was killed which triggered the start of the genocide.190  
Power writes that “From April 7 onward the Hutu-controlled army, the gendarmerie, and 
the militias worked together to wipe out Rwanda’s Tutsi,” emphasizing the speed of the onset of 
violence, further pointing to the planning needed for the genocide before the plane was shot 
down.191 The Rwandan genocide took place in a hundred days (Vik states that the genocide 
happened in 90 days) in which 800,000 Tutsi and “politically moderate Hutu” were killed.192 
Power writes that the Rwandan genocide was “the fastest, most efficient killing spree of the 
twentieth century.”193 Between the deaths, refugees, internally displaced peoples, Rwanda 
experiences a “temporary reduction of the population by 50 percent.”194 The Rwandan genocide, 
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and the lack of humanitarian intervention by the international community to stop the killings in 
Rwanda has been a mark on the post-World War II world.  
 The moral imperative for action in the Rwandan genocide was present. The genocide was 
not only a severe atrocity to human rights, but also violated the Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention). If we are to continue to 
operate under the idea that moral imperative must fulfill both a humanitarian imperative, as well 
as the belief that action could benefit the international order, then the Rwandan genocide would 
mark a very high level of moral imperative. Vik speaks to this point when she writes, 
Recognizing the power of its solidarist commitment to the Genocide Convention, the 
Clinton administration assumed that invoking the term “genocide” would engender 
expectations of a response that would include dispatching troops, which carries enormous 
responsibility.195 
The term genocide points to the strong necessity of action against it. Power writes that American 
officials  
felt that using it [the term genocide] would have obliged the United States to act, under 
the terms of the 1948 Genocide Convention. They also believed, understandably, that it 
would harm U.S. credibility to name the crime and then do nothing about it.196 
As genocide has been recognized by the United Nations as “a crime under international law, 
contrary to the spirit and aims of the United Nations and condemned by the civilized world” 
through the Genocide Convention, members of the UN, including the US, would be bound by 
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this convention.197 Article 8 of the Genocide Convention states that “competent organs of the 
United Nations” may be called on “for the prevention and suppression of acts of genocide” or 
genocide-related crimes.198 The moral imperative for genocide prevention is high, as genocide is 
recognized by the United Nations as harmful to humanity, to the extent that prevention and 
suppression of genocide is codified. However, the prevention and punishment of genocide, as 
outlined in the Convention, is left to the domestic laws of the signatory countries. While 
countries may intervene, they are not obliged to intervene to stop genocide going on 
elsewhere.199   
 When looking at sources on the US response to the Rwandan genocide, Rwanda was seen 
by the US as a low priority.200 Vik writes how the US policy in Rwanda from the Department of 
Defense and State Department stated that the US should be involved in the peace process in 
Rwanda but that the US wanted peace before continuing its involvement.201 However, the 
conflict in itself was not a US national interest. Vik writes that  
the Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, James Woods, was asked to remove 
Rwanda and Burundi from the list of potential crisis areas generated after the Clinton 
administration took office because involvement in these conflicts was not considered to 
promote “US national interests.”202 
In his memoir Shake Hands with the Devil, Lieutenant General Romeo Dallaire, who led 
UNAMIR in Rwanda during the genocide, wrote about how Rwanda was not of interest to the 
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international community as a whole. He writes about an unnamed group of bureaucrats who 
assessed the situation in Rwanda during the early stages and stated, “We will recommend to our 
government not to intervene as the risks are high and all that is here [in Rwanda] are humans.”203 
This quote, although not specifically attributed to the United States, highlights the belief that 
Rwanda was not of strategic importance, and that the moral imperative of saving human lives 
was not strong enough to necessitate intervention.  
 Although the US did not militarily intervene in Rwanda during the genocide, there were 
some concerns on the United Nations level about the successfulness of a UN mission into 
Rwanda. “The major concern of the Security Council was that were the UN to suffer another 
disaster like Somalia with more peacekeepers being killed, the UN would suffer a possibly fatal 
blow to its credibility.”204  
While PDD-25 draft, before the Battle of Mogadishu, included that the American troops 
in UN missions should be under US command, the implementation of PDD-25 afterwards could 
provide a difference between Bosnia and Rwanda. As military action in Bosnia took place 
through NATO auspices and could provide Americans to feel more control in intervention.205 In 
Rwanda, the US did not have an actor in the region that could help provide humanitarian 
intervention with more American control, like NATO did in Bosnia. However, there was no 
regional actor like NATO in Africa during the US intervention in Somalia. Power discusses how 
a senior US official spoke about the lack of US response to Rwanda as a “foregone conclusion.” 
Power writes that the “most remarkable” aspect of the American response was “that during the 
entire genocide the possibility of U.S. military intervention was never even debated.”206 
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 Although the United States was set on nonintervention in Rwanda, as the genocide was 
not considered a high enough impetus for intervention, it is important to note that the Rwandan 
terrain would have been difficult to negotiate. In her Atlantic article, Power notes that Rwanda is 
called the “land of a thousand hills.”207 The hilly terrain would pose some of the same concerns 
with intervention as Joffe had about Bosnia. Similarly, the door-to-door mode of violence in 
Rwanda, would have been similar Joffe’s conclusion about Bosnia, and why intervention would 
have been difficult.208 
 While there were numerous news reports coming out during the genocide, there did not 
appear to be a large domestic push for intervention.209 DiPrizio noted that the West Virginia 
Senator, Robert Byrd became skeptical of US involvement during American intervention in 
Somalia, which led to the House of Representatives and Senate passing nonbinding resolutions 
“calling for the president to consult with the increasingly skeptical Congress on the future of the 
[Somalia] mission.”210 DiPrizio argues that the negative Congressional feedback from Somalia 
hurt US involvement in Rwanda. Although DiPrizio notes rhetoric by Congress for the ending of 
violence in Rwanda, “There was no congressional clamor for intervention, and no efforts were 
made to pressure the Clinton administration to respond more vigorously.”211 This statement 
reflects how the United States reacted passively to the Rwandan genocide while it was occurring. 
Vik also notes that there was a lack of pressure by Congress, or the American people, on the 
Clinton Administration to intervene in Rwanda. Vik’s describes the lack of support for 
intervention in Rwanda as connected to the Administration’s avoidance of the word genocide. 
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Vik argues that the usage of the term genocide could have created a greater imperative for 
intervention in the domestic arena.212 
 In his chapter “Limited Vision: How Both the American Media and Government Failed 
Rwanda,” Steven Livingston notes that there was very low media coverage of the Rwandan 
genocide during the conflict.213 Livingston argues that media coverage does not “have the ability 
to reprioritize policy objectives and policymakers’ attention,” but that US policy makers 
mistakenly believed that US intervention in Somalia was predicated by the CNN effect, and they 
did not want the media coverage to draw the US into Rwanda.214  
 The Rwandan genocide also experienced other complicating factors. The Rwandan 
government, who was committing the genocide, was one of the rotating members of the UNSC 
during the genocide.215 Likewise, the US called for the withdrawal of UNAMIR from Rwanda 
during the genocide.216 Power writes that the US pushed for the withdrawal of UNAMIR from 
Rwanda as a way to provide Belgium cover for pulling out their own troops.217 The American 
push for a UN withdrawal from Rwanda was justified as a way to protect the viability of UN 
Peacekeeping as a whole.218 In Clinton’s apology speech to Rwanda, in March 1998, he stated 
that he did not know the extent of the horrors of the genocide.219 However, the point of lack of 
information about the genocide has been a contested point by many authors, including Power. 
Even within first person accounts of the American policy, there is a lack of clarity over what was 
known. Vik includes quotes from various American officials including Deputy Assistant 
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Secretary of State Prudence Bushnell (who explicitly told the Rwandan government to stop 
killing people), and Joyce Leader, second-in-command in the US embassy in Rwanda, who 
stated it was hard for the US Embassy to understand the extent of the violence.220 
 The speed of the genocide is also a complicating factor of the Rwandan genocide. While 
there was time for the US to intervene, the speed of the genocide did not allow the United States 
much time to reevaluate their policy. The humanitarian crisis in Bosnia, on the other hand started 
in 1992 and extended into 1996; the longer timeline allowed the US to change its policy and 
intervene in 1995.  
 
Brune-Joffe Criteria: 
 Each case study has its own unique characteristics. While the Brune-Joffe criteria 
standardizes how I approached my case studies, I wanted to take a moment to summarize some 
of the unique characteristics of each of these cases studies.  
 In the case of Somalia, the decision to intervene could have been confounded by 
President Bush’s status as a lame-duck President. As a lame-duck President, President Bush 
would not have had to worry about the electoral impact of his decision to intervene; the deterrent 
of being voted out of office would no longer apply to President Bush as he was already voted out 
of power in November 1992, while his term did not end until January 1993.  
 The conflict in Croatia was especially sticky, as there was not a clear delineation of 
sovereignty and recognition at the beginning of the conflict. The JNA was an active player in the 
conflict, and acted as the legitimate Yugoslav military force over Croatia, as a republic of 
Yugoslavia. Up until Croatia was recognized as an independent state, the JNA utilizing military 
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force would have in the capacity of a domestic issue. As there was contestation over Croatian 
sovereignty, the role of the JNA in Croatia would have been contentious as the JNA was both 
seen as a legitimate force, as well as a foreign aggressor.  
 In Bosnia, intervention was unique due to the strong role of NATO in the intervention, as 
well as the interconnectedness between the conflicts in Bosnia, and the conflict in Slovenia and 
Croatia. 
 In the Rwandan case, the speed of the conflict was a complicating factor into the foreign 
policy creation for intervention. Unlike Bosnia or Somalia, in which the United States had 
outside national interests that could be fulfilled by humanitarian intervention, intervention within 
Rwanda did not solve another US national interest. 
 The Brune-Joffe criteria allowed me to analyze the information from these four cases in a 
standardized fashion. As a way to organize my research, I created a table in which I outlined the 
Brune-Joffe criteria, and then filled in how each case study either fulfilled or did not fulfill the 
criteria.  
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PDD-25 and US Foreign Policy: 
Joffe’s criteria of intervention provided an explanation of candidates favorable to United 
States for intervention: if national interests were involved, a strong moral imperative for 
intervention, reasonable chance of success, and domestic support.221 In his article in Foreign 
Affairs in which he outlined the criteria for intervention, “The New Europe: Yesterday’s 
Ghosts,” Joffe explains how the US intervention in Kuwait during the Gulf War fit into his 
criteria, while a case of non-intervention, such as Bosnia (at that time), did not fulfill the 
requirements for intervention.222 Brune, using Joffe’s criteria, evaluated Bosnia and Somalia in 
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depth. In this thesis, I also evaluated intervention in Bosnia and Somalia, as well as evaluate non-
intervention in Croatia and Rwanda according to Joffe’s criteria.  
The Presidential Decision Directive-25 (PDD 25) has been mentioned by DiPrizio and 
Power, as a response to the Battle of Mogadishu in Somalia, as well as presented Rwanda as a 
victim of this new policy.223 The PDD-25 was created during the Clinton Administration and “set 
guidelines for determining when the United States would support a U.N. peace operation, when 
it would participate in an operation, and when it would contribute combat troops.”224 As DiPrizio 
illustrates through his chapters on both Rwanda and Haiti, PDD-25 did not stop US 
Humanitarian Intervention in Haiti in 1994, but the US did not intervene in Rwanda in the 
summer of 1994.225  
In a speech to John Hopkins University on September 21, 1993, Anthony Lake 
emphasized the need for the United States to work in its own best interests. He stated, “with 
responsibilities for our security policies, only one overriding factor can determine whether the 
US should act multilaterally or unilaterally, and that is America’s interests.”226 This statement 
emphasizes the United States’ right to selectivity that as an independent, sovereign nation the 
United States has the right to act within its own national interests, and has the right to allow 
national interests to prevail. While there is the consideration of rhetoric versus reality, Lake’s 
statement points to the important salience of national interests regarding intervention policy.  
In the book, UN Peacekeeping, American Politics, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s, 
Daalder wrote a chapter “Knowing When to Say No: The Development of US Policy for 
Peacekeeping” in which he describes the challenges and hesitations the US had towards 
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peacekeeping. Daalder described the waning enthusiasm for multilateral peacekeeping missions, 
illustrating evolution of stance on an intervention within an Administration.227 While Clinton 
was critical of Bush’s lack of intervention during the presidential campaign, when Clinton 
became President, he was more hesitant once in office.228 Daalder explains the hesitation by the 
Clinton administration as a repercussion of Clinton’s electoral mandate stemming from the 
public’s desire to put domestic politics in the foreground of American policy.229 The fluctuation 
in US foreign policy, or the apparent lack of policy, towards American participation in 
peacekeeping missions can also be explained by fluctuating interests. In the epilogue of his book, 
Brune summarizes US Humanitarian Intervention in the 1990s by stating that 
The two presidents [Bush and Clinton] never clearly identified US national interests in 
the domestic turmoil of small countries and were reluctant to become the world’s 
policeman. Neither president favored an isolationist attitude, but both were uncertain 
about what type of a new world order to seek and what role the U.S. should play as the 
remaining superpower.230 
In this statement, Brune addresses the core of US foreign policy at the end of the Cold War. At 
the beginning of the post-Cold War era in the 1990s, the US struggled to find its role in the 
international arena. Rosati and Twing described the transition of US foreign policy out of the 
Cold World. They state that “the Bush administration’s foreign policy was caught between the 
strong legacy of the cold war past and the great uncertainty of the post-cold war future.”231 While 
I would argue, due to Bush’s intervention into Somalia, that he wanted a more forward leaning 
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interventionist policy in the post-Cold War world, one cannot know how he would have reacted 
if he was in office during the Battle of Mogadishu or when the European allies were unable to 
bring peace in the Balkans. If the saliency of domestic backlash to the Bush Administration 
became higher, one could see Bush taking a similar policy to the Clinton Administration’s 
withdrawal. The US was faced with many choices in its international role and identity, such as 
isolationism vs internationalism and multilateralism vs unilateralism.232 As illustrated through 
the speeches in the Clinton Foreign Policy Reader, The US’ interests in humanitarian 
intervention stemmed from the notion that “It is the right thing to do.”233 While specifically 
underlining US interests in Bosnia, and justifying continued intervention during the Dayton 
Peace Accord implementation, the White House gave figures of casualties and refugees as an 
illustration of the importance of American intervention to implement peace.234 These numbers 
gave the impression that the severity of the Bosnian crisis played into the need for intervention 
through a moral imperative for action. However, one could easily look at the number of 
casualties in the Rwandan genocide and conclude that there was a greater moral imperative for 
intervention. This comparison of casualties could point to two possible explanations: numbers of 
casualties are not an accurate measure of the severity of suffering, or that there are other 
motivations for intervention that would create a difference between cases, despite number of 
casualties. While I believe that the number of causalities could be a good measure of severity of 
conflict, not all crises result in death, such as starvation or ethnic cleansing. These kinds of crises 
differ from genocides in which the aim of the perpetrator is to eliminate a group of people. 
Intervention may only be partially dependent on the severity of the crisis, and more dependent on 
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issues such as national interest and domestic support—the non-intervention case of Rwanda 
points to this explanation, as the crisis was extreme.  
 As discussed, there was a lack of overarching policy regarding US Humanitarian 
Intervention. PDD-25 attempted to clarify US policy on humanitarian intervention, however it 
produced mixed results regarding intervention, as discussed by DiPrizio in the examples of 
intervention in Haiti versus non-intervention in Rwanda.235 However, it is important to note that 
PDD-25 was created as a way to allow the United States to evaluate humanitarian crises and 
decide whether or not to intervene, meaning that, regardless of the perceived goodness or 
badness of the policy, PDD-25 could have been fulfilling its role.  
  
Thoughts and Conclusion: 
 In my thesis, I have used the Brune-Joffe criteria for humanitarian intervention as a tool 
to evaluate the determinants of US foreign policy regarding US humanitarian intervention 
through military means in both intervention and non-intervention cases.  
 The Brune-Joffe criteria for humanitarian intervention appear to provide a fairly good set 
of criteria for understanding foreign policy creation by the United States regarding humanitarian 
intervention in the 1990s. In this thesis, I examined Somalia, Bosnia, Croatia, and Rwanda as 
cases in which to evaluate this criteria.  
 Both Brune and Joffe regarded Somalia as a case of “purely humanitarian” intervention. 
As part of their criteria, Brune and Joffe argue that if military force was utilized, moral 
imperative would not be a strong enough criteria for intervention.236 However, both regarded 
Somalia as an outlier, due to the fact that military force was employed but the US had no 
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strategic interest in Somalia. In order to address this major asterisk in their criteria, I tried to 
examine what made Bosnia and Somalia similar to each other, as two cases of intervention. 
Likewise, I tried to use the change in policy regarding Bosnia as a key to try to understand why 
intervention was taken there, and to see if this reasoning could perhaps stretch to Somalia as 
well. In my research, I found that the national interest in a conflict could be more influenced by 
its larger foreign policy impact, versus upon the country itself. For example, intervention in 
Somalia could have served the purpose of quelling criticism by Muslim countries for not 
intervening on behalf of Muslim countries. The benefit reaped from this intervention, then, 
would not have to do with Somalia itself. Similarly, if intervention in Bosnia was only for the 
benefit of European alliances, then intervention in Bosnia as the specific recipient of 
intervention, is less important than the intervention itself. However, it is important to caution that 
in trying to find other reasons for intervention, one could miss cases that are actually outliers. 
Looking at US intervention in Somalia, I would conclude that it was an outlier to the Brune-Joffe 
criteria. As Somalia seemed to be a spoiler for later cases of intervention, one could consider that 
there was a lower critical point for intervention based off its earlier time frame, or the successes 
of the Gulf War and intervention in Kuwait.237 It would be interesting to note how the role of 
political memory plays out in policy creation for humanitarian intervention.  
 Another major point of this thesis was looking at the moral imperative for action. All 
cases experienced human rights violations, as all conflicts were humanitarian crises. However, 
since the US did not participate in humanitarian intervention in all UN missions, it is important 
to try to note what could differentiate between cases. The Brune-Joffe criteria regards moral 
imperative as stemming from the idea that “the U.S. and other nations must protect human rights 
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and civilized standards of moral behavior,” meaning that intervention must be seen as protecting 
an important international norm.238 While all human rights violations are egregious, there is a 
critical point in which these violations are not tolerated by the international community—
however, this critical point may not necessitate humanitarian intervention. For example, the 
human rights violations in Myanmar have been condemned by the international community, but 
have not necessitated intervention.239 The call for intervention in humanitarian crises by the 
UNSC illustrates what is tolerated and what is not. Likewise, the United States must also come to 
this conclusion to intervene within a UN peace operation.  
 The Brune-Joffe criteria does not address the role of international law upon the policy 
making decision of the United States in humanitarian intervention. In the case of Rwanda, due to 
the Genocide Convention, one would expect that the US would have intervened, which did not 
happen. However, the case of Rwanda does bring up the question of whether the saliency of 
moral imperative impacts the likelihood of intervention, or whether outside factors can diminish 
moral imperative for intervention. Likewise, the Brune-Joffe criteria does not address the 
strength of each of the criteria on the policy creation for or against humanitarian intervention. 
Would a case of extremely strong national interest and weak moral imperative (such as 
Afghanistan) have more, less, or equal likelihood of humanitarian intervention as a case of 
extremely strong moral imperative and weak national interests? After comparing Rwanda to the 
cases of Somalia and Bosnia, I would venture to answer that national interest plays a stronger 
role in the likelihood of intervention, however this would need to be tested for statistical 
significance through a quantitative analysis of humanitarian interventions.  
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 In future research, one could test the Brune-Joffe criteria for intervention across a larger 
time series, and test whether policy creation for intervention has changed significantly between 
eras of intervention. Likewise, one could test the Brune-Joffe criteria for other actors such as the 
UN or the EU. Research about the saliency of each of the Brune-Joffe criteria would be 
beneficial to the discussion of Humanitarian Intervention.  
 The Brune-Joffe criteria provide a starting point in which one can examine how the US 
created Humanitarian Intervention policy in the 1990s. Analyzing the case studies through the 
Brune-Joffe criteria highlights how the saliency of each of these criteria can change between 
cases, as well as during cases. For example, in the case of Rwanda, the moral imperative 
criterion did not appear to have as much weight as national interest in comparison to the weight 
of moral imperative in Somalia. The case of Somalia also highlights the change in saliency 
between the criteria within one case of intervention. Moral imperative had high saliency at the 
beginning of the intervention, however reasonable chance of success and domestic support 
became more important after the Battle of Mogadishu, and the US’s decision to withdraw (even 
though the moral imperative of mass starvation had not been eliminated).  
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Appendix 
UN Peacekeeping Selection Chart—Cases Eliminated 
 
UN Missions outside frame of 
study UN Acronymn Name of Mission Location Years
Missions outside timeframe
UNAVEM I Angola Verification Mission I Angola 1989-1991
UNTAG Transition Assistance Group Namibia 1989-1990
ONUCA Observer Group in Central America
Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Nicaragua 1989-1992
UNMIBH Mission in Bosnia Herzegovina Bosnia-Herzegovina 1995-2002
UNMOP Mission of Observers in Prevlaka "Croatia" 1996-2002
MIPONUH Civilian Police Mission in Haiti Haiti 1997-2000
MINURCA Mission in the Central African Republic Central African Republic 1998-2000
Observer Missions
ONUSAL Observer Mission in El Salvedor El Salvador 1991-95
UNOMIL Observer Mission in Liberia Liberia 1993-1997
UNASOG Aouzou Strip Observer Group Libya/ Chad May 1994-June 1994
UNMOT Mission of Observers in Tajikistan Tajikistan 1994-2000
MONUA Observer Mission in Angola Angola 1997-1999
UNOMSIL Observer Mission in Sierra Leone Sierra Leone 1998-1999
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Integrated Timeline 
Year Domestic and Foreign events of 
interest to the US
Bosnia Croatia Somalia Rwanda 
1990 Iraq invades Kuwait November 1990: Elections: powersharing 
between 3 ethnic parties
1990s in general: economic hardship with the 
decrease in world price of coffee; poor weather--
food shortages (Vik 41) 
1990-1993: separate instances of militia and Hutu 
militants killing hundreds of Tutsis (Vik 41)
1991 Continues into Gulf War Croatia and Slovenia declare their independence 
from Yugoslavia--beginning of tensions growing 
in federation
Croatia declares its independence; Croatia 
worries about being intervened in because 
of conflict in Slovenia
Diplomatic Intervention is taking place 
through a European Community envoy 
(Troika) and through UN arms sanctioning
Jan 26, 1991: USC guerilla army overran Mogadishu--they put a Hawiye, 
Ali Madhi Mohammed in as president (Schraeder 332)
May 17, 1991: SNM seceding northern part of Somalia into Somaliland 
Republic (devolves into civil war) (Schraeder 332 from After the End)
1992 Bush administration saw 
intervention in Somalia as 
doable, while Bosnia wasn't 
(feeling pressure from Muslim 
nations to help--only had 
attacked as in Iraq) (Chang 74)
Clinton elected on "it's the 
economy stupid"
Domestic/congressional 
pressures to "do something" in 
Somalia (Schraeder 337)
February 22: UN Res 743 creates UNPROFOR 
(not for Bosnia yet)
Feb 29: Referendum for independence passes--
SERBS boycotted vote 
Apr 2-3: Bijelina taken over by Serb Paramilitary
Apr 7-8: Zvornik: 49,000 Muslims expelled
EC recognizes BiH
8: US recognizes Slovenia, Croatia and BiH 
May 23-30: Prijedor captured; ethnic cleansing 
works here 
1992: UNPROFOR extended into Humanirarian 
Assistance 
Jan 3: Vance announces cease-fire 
between Croatian Forces and JNA
Jan 15: EC formally recognizes Slovenia and 
Croatia
February 22: UN Res 743 creates 
UNPROFOR
Apr 8: US recognizes Slovenia, Croatia, and 
BiH
April 24, 1992: US voted for UNSC Res 751--monitor ceasefire (UNOSOM 
I)--US didn't want direct military involvement (Shraeder 334)
August 14, 1992: US announced Op Provide Relief, which was a short-
term Humanitarian airlift of food aid under UNOSOM I (Schraeder 335)
Nov 25th: Bush proposed UNITAF--Operation Restore Hope)
Nov 25: NSC meeting devoted to Somalia--Bush chooses the most 
interventionist option provided to him (Shraeder 336)--State, CIA, 
Pentagon didn't like military intervention option at first (336-337) 
Dec 4, 1992: Bush says he's ready for US to have military operation to 
create secure environment --Operation Restore Hope/ UNITAF 
(sanctioned through UNSC Res 794) (Schrader 336)
1993 Clinton gets into office 
February: starts promoting 
NAFTA and Uruguay Round for 
GATT
Dick Morris (Clinton's former 
chief strategist) Clinton will only 
pay attention to global when so 
intrusive that it becomes 
domestic problem (Schraeder 
339)
Clinton involved but Bush 
hadn't made a clear exit 
strategy (Shrader 340)
Declining public opinion about 
Somalia- (Schraeder 346)  
UN declares "safe areas" 
UN declares no fly zone--enforced by NATO
ICTY is set up (all stuff happened after 1991)
ICTY set up (all stuff that happened after 
1991) 
March 26th, Clinton expands UNITAF into UNOSOM II (Chang 75) 
UNSC Res 814--put less US forces there, but in "quick response force" 
(Shraeder 341)
May 4: UNSC Res 814 put in place in Somalia (Schraeder 341)
June 5: 24 Pakistani peacekeepers were killed (Schraeder 343)
June 24, 1993: Resolution 837 passed by UN--UN/US forces conducting 
combat mission ( Chang 75) 
Schraeder also talks about this resolution which made it UNOSOM II vs 
Aidid (343)
October 3: 18 US Soldiers killed (battle of Mogadishu)--Chang (76), After 
the End
Oct 7: Clinton makes televised address saying that US is going to be fully 
withdrawn from Somalia by March 31, 1994  (Schraeder 345) 
August 4, 1993: Arusha Accords signed: 
powersharing and political reform (Vik 41)
UNAMIR created as a way to monitor Arusha 
Accords implementation
Week after Arusha Accords assigned, UN report 
stated that there was a high probability for genocide 
against the Tutsi (Vik 42) 
October 1993: 40,000 people had been killed in Hutu-
Tutsi violence in Burundi
1994 Congressional Elections; Chang--
continues neoisloationist trend
May 4: PDD 25 implemented; 
Vik argues that this was an 
informal guide to dealing with 
Rwanda (36)
March 1994: Washington Agreement 
brings an end to Muslim/Croat fight and creates 
FBiH 
April 1994: Contact Group 
Russia, US, UK, Germany, France, Italy
coming up with a peace proposal: come up with 
51% 49% divide between FBiH and RS
April 6, 1994: President Habyarimana was 
assassinated
Power had Apr 7th as important date 
April 14th: Beligum wants "cover" for them pulling 
out of Rwanda (Power 330)
April 15th: Christopher sends cable to Albright for 
UN to pull out of Rwanda (Power 330)
April 25th: Most of Dallaire's troops had been 
evacuated, went down to 503 (in end)  (Power 331) 
May 21st: Warren Christopher authorizes use of 
term "genocide" not used in public for 3 more weeks 
(Vik 40) (Power also says this p 328) 
1995 NATO Operation Deliberate Force
bombing command and control centers for 
Bosnian Serbs 
Dayton Accords: agreed upon in November, 
signed in Paris in December
After Dayton you have the creation of IFOR
August 5: Operation Storm (Croatian 
forces) 
Operation Flash before?
1996 Presidential Election Year September: Bosnia has elections monitored by 
OSCE 
SFOR replaces IFOR 
